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THE COURT’S FRAUD DUD 
SAMUEL W. BUELL* 
In this contribution to a collection of essays on the Supreme Court’s 
2009 October Term, I comment on the Court’s trilogy of mail fraud 
cases, disposed of principally through the majority’s opinion in 
Skilling v. United States. The Court’s solution to the problem of 
“honest services fraud” was tidy but somewhat arbitrary and quite 
shallow. The Court seemed to recognize that the cases presented the 
problem of how to deal with frauds that involve indirect benefits to 
violators and/or intangible harms to victims. This can be termed the 
“relationship and context” problem in fraud or, if one prefers, the 
“duty problem.” But the Court failed to engage with this problem 
conceptually, missing a golden opportunity to develop the 
jurisprudence of fraud that is not likely to arise again for a long 
time. I explain the problem, demonstrate that it is not limited to the 
recent tempest over the “honest services” statute and its 
constitutionality, and suggest some directions for addressing it that 
the Court might have pursued. 
 
For those of us who study criminal fraud, the most recent Supreme 
Court term had promised a very big day in the sun. The Court granted 
certiorari and heard argument in no fewer than three cases presenting 
questions of great import about the federal criminal law of fraud.1 
Two of the three cases involved major prosecutions of high-profile 
executives of public companies. The third involved a state legislator 
prosecuted in a federal campaign against graft in and around the 
Alaska statehouse. The Court’s endeavor—its largest ever in this 
field—presented an occasion for signal jurisprudence in the field of 
fraud. 
 
 * Professor, Duke University School of Law. Many thanks to Sara Sun Beale and Lisa 
Griffin for helpful comments on a draft. 
 1. Black v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 2963 (2010); Skilling v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 2896 
(2010); Weyhrauch v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 2971 (2010). 
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What a disappointment. The Court decided fraud questions in 
only one of the three cases. Two cases were sent back to courts of 
appeals for further analysis in light of the decided case.2 The case with 
which the Court genuinely engaged, Skilling v. United States,3 
produced opinions occupied mostly with the fairness of a single jury 
selection, so fact-bound as not likely to be of great influence in the 
law of criminal procedure.4 On the fraud issues, the Skilling majority 
opinion, authored by Justice Ginsburg and winning six votes, was 
result-oriented and sketchy—even if it may have satisfied many of the 
constituencies who have been complaining for years about the statute 
in question. Justice Scalia’s concurring opinion, perhaps for having too 
easy of a target or for being preoccupied with his favorite claims 
about judicial function, also did not engage with the conceptual 
problems at the root of the fraud questions brought forth in the 2009 
October Term. 
My intention in this brief essay is to discuss what the Court failed 
to address as a way of demonstrating (and perhaps warning) that 
difficult problems in the criminal law of fraud are likely to persist with 
nearly as much force in the wake of the Court’s big “mail fraud” 
trilogy as they did before its arrival. In particular, the Court did not 
engage with the conceptual problem underlying the brouhaha that 
presumably caused the Court to grant certiorari in these cases. The 
issue before the Court was the meaning and constitutional viability of 
a statute prohibiting frauds designed to deprive another of “the 
intangible right to honest services” (the “honest services” problem).5 
But beneath this issue lies the question under what conditions, if any, 
a breach of fiduciary duty may constitute a fraud. Or, put a bit more 
generally, what is the relationship between fiduciary duties and fraud? 
 
 2. Black, 130 S. Ct. at 2963; Weyhrauch, 130 S. Ct. at 2971. 
 3. Skilling v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 2896 (2010). 
 4. It remains a mystery to me why the Court granted certiorari on the jury issue in 
Skilling, agreeing for the first time in a long while to address the issue of prejudice in jury pools 
due to media exposure, only to produce a 6-3 decision that will stand, Bush v. Gore-like, for the 
proposition that “this one was okay.” 
 5. The mail and wire fraud statutes, 18 U.S.C.A. § 1341 (West 2010) and 18 U.S.C.A. § 
1343 (West 2010), prohibit, among other things, any “scheme or artifice to defraud.”  The 
“honest services” statute, 18 U.S.C.A. § 1346 (West 2010), states that the term “scheme or 
artifice to defraud” in the mail and wire fraud statutes “includes a scheme or artifice to deprive 
another of the intangible right of honest services.” 
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Fiduciary duties and fraud have long been well acquainted.6 These 
questions predate the late twentieth-century story of honest services 
fraud in federal court and they have persisted throughout the history 
of fraud law. They will continue to arise in spite of the Court’s effort 
in Skilling to limit the mail fraud statute’s reach. The law continues to 
need instruments for determining when fraud—especially criminal 
fraud—is committed in fiduciary relationships. The Supreme Court 
failed to provide those instruments. I cannot do so in this brief essay 
on three Court decisions, but I will suggest possible directions for 
locating such instruments. 
In Part I, I begin by briefly summarizing what the Court did with 
its fraud cases from the October 2009 term. In Part II, I describe the 
problem involving fiduciary duty that was not adequately addressed. 
In Part III, I finish by explaining why the problem will persist and by 
suggesting some means of dealing with it. 
I. THE COURT’S MAIL FRAUD TRILOGY 
The Court granted certiorari and heard argument in three cases 
plainly meant to settle, or at least ameliorate, a long-brewing 
controversy about federal mail fraud law. The kerfuffle was over 
whether the concept of defrauding another of “the intangible right of 
honest services” was too vague to be a basis on which to ground 
criminal liability consistent with the Constitution’s due process 
guarantee. In the post-war period, but mostly during the 1970s and 
1980s, the federal courts had uniformly found this concept to be 
included within the more general concept of fraud—at least for 
purposes of the mail and wire fraud statutes, which criminalize 
virtually all fraud using mail or interstate wires.7 In 1987, the Court 
ruled in McNally v. United States8 that the concept of “honest services 
fraud” did not exist because it did not appear in the statutes and could 
not be implied from them.9 Congress promptly contravened the Court 
by enacting a new statute explicitly stating that mail and wire fraud 
 
 6. See, e.g., W. PAGE KEATON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEATON ON TORTS § 106, 738–39 
(5th ed. 1984). 
 7. See, e.g., United States v. Bush, 522 F.2d 641, 648 (7th Cir. 1975) (“Much was said at 
trial about the fact that the city did not lose money . . . . However, that argument is not 
convincing. [T]he mail fraud statute seeks to prohibit fraudulent conduct regardless of ultimate 
loss or damage to the victims of the crime.”). 
 8. McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350 (1987), superseded by statute, 18 U.S.C.A. § 
1346 (West 2010) as recognized in Skilling v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 2896 (2010). 
 9. McNally, 483 U.S. at 359–60. 
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included efforts to deprive another of “the intangible right of honest 
services.”10 
For over two decades, hundreds of people were sent off to federal 
prison under the authority of this statute. All the while, the criminal 
defense bar, some academics, and some federal judges (who remained 
dissenters only) complained that the new statute did not provide 
constitutionally sufficient notice of what conduct it criminalized and 
that it criminalized non-blameworthy behavior.11 These faults 
compounded themselves by generating excessive discretionary power 
in the hands of federal prosecutors. 
A routine move in such arguments was to decry the prosecution of 
individuals at the outer boundaries of the honest services concept: a 
law firm partner who, without disclosing the conflict to anyone, took 
on a client whose opponent was represented by his partners;12 a sports 
agent who established relationships with college players in violation 
of NCAA rules;13 a party boss who arranged for county jobs to be 
doled out in exchange for political contributions;14 and a professor 
who awarded doctorates without merit with the expectation of 
receiving grant money from the students once they obtained 
government jobs.15 For unknown reasons, the Court decided that 2009 
was the year that it would be moved by these voices. 
In Weyhrauch v. United States,16 the Court granted review on the 
question of whether the statute should be narrowed to require proof 
that the accused violated a state law (plus other elements of the 
offense) in an honest services prosecution.17 Weyhrauch, an Alaska 
legislator at the relevant time, allegedly solicited future employment 
 
 10. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1346 (West 2010). 
 11. See, e.g., Julie R. O’Sullivan, Honest-Services Fraud: A (Vague) Threat to Millions of 
Blissfully Unaware (and Non-Culpable) American Workers, 63 VAND. L. REV. EN BANC 23, 24 
(2010) (suggesting that the statute be struck on grounds of unconstitutional vagueness); Mathew 
N. Brown, Prosecutorial Discretion and Federal Mail Fraud, 21 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 667, 667 
(2008) (arguing that mail fraud statutes are unnecessarily vague and result in prosecutorial 
abuses); Geraldine Szott Moohr, Mail Fraud and the Intangible Rights Doctrine: Someone to 
Watch Over Us, 31 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 153, 177 (1994) (discussing that the mail fraud statutes 
fail to provide adequate notice of criminality). 
 12. United States v. Bronston, 658 F.2d 920, 922–33 (2d Cir. 1981). 
 13. United States v. Walters, 997 F.2d 1219, 1221 (7th Cir. 1993); United States v. Walters, 
913 F.2d 388, 390 (7th Cir. 1990). 
 14. United States v. Margiotta, 688 F.2d 108, 113–14 (2d Cir. 1982). 
 15. United States v. Frost, 125 F.3d 346, 352–53 (6th Cir. 1997). 
 16. Weyhrauch v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 2971 (2010). 
 17. Brief for Petitioner at i, Weyhrauch v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2971 (2010) (No. 08-
1196). 
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from an oil company while helping the same company block proposed 
legislation.18 He was fairly typical of the public sector defendants who 
had been appearing in honest services prosecutions over the years. 
In United States v. Black,19 the Court granted review on the 
question whether the statute should be narrowed to require proof 
that the defendant contemplated economic or property harm to the 
victim, in addition to other elements of the offense.20 Black was a 
Canadian newspaper magnate who, as controlling shareholder of a 
public company, arranged for sales of his company’s newspaper assets 
to include large non-compete payments to him that lacked substance 
or justification and allegedly were disguised bonuses.21 Black was an 
example of a private sector defendant in an honest services 
prosecution charged with a form of corporate looting. 
United States v. Skilling also involved a corporate executive in the 
private sector. Here the substance of the charge was accounting fraud. 
Skilling, the former CEO of the collapsed Enron Corporation, was 
convicted for committing both securities fraud and honest services 
fraud by misrepresenting the financial condition of his company in 
order to inflate and maintain a false stock price.22 Along with the jury 
issue in Skilling, the Court granted certiorari on the question whether 
the honest services fraud statute should be narrowed to require that 
the government prove that the defendant intended to gain personally 
from his conduct, in addition to other elements of fraud.23 The Court 
also granted review on the question whether the statute was 
unconstitutionally vague. 
 
 18. United States v. Weyhrauch, 548 F.3d 1237, 1239–40 (9th Cir. 2008), cert. granted in 
part, 129 S. Ct. 2863 (2009), vacated and remanded, 130 S. Ct. 2971 (2010). 
 19. Black v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 2963 (2010). 
 20. Brief for Petitioner at i, United States v. Black, 130 S. Ct. 2963 (2010) (No. 08-876). 
 21. United States v. Black, 530 F.3d 596, 599–600 (7th Cir. 2008), reh’g and suggestion for 
reh’g en banc denied (Aug. 13, 2008), cert. granted, 129 S. Ct. 2379 (2009), vacated and 
remanded, 130 S. Ct. 2963 (2010). 
 22. See United States v. Skilling, 554 F.3d 529 (5th Cir. 2009), cert. granted, 130 S. Ct. 393 
(2009), aff’d in part, vacated in part, remanded, 130 S. Ct. 2896 (2010). Some have viewed the 
“honest services” theory in Skilling as envelope-pushing, even within the controversy over the 
mail fraud statute. See, e.g., NORMAN ABRAMS, SARA SUN BEALE, & SUSAN RIVA KLEIN, 
FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS ENFORCEMENT 175–77 (5th ed. 2010). But if a corporate 
fiduciary owes any duty beyond the duty not to steal from the corporation it would seem to 
include the duty not to commit accounting fraud. Even if there were not reported decisions 
embracing this theory prior to Skilling, I am sure I have seen it in many corporate fraud 
indictments. Granted, I am readily chargeable with bias, having been one of the Department of 
Justice prosecutors who conducted the criminal investigation in the Enron matter (though I left 
the government before the honest services theory was placed in Skilling’s indictment). 
 23. Brief for Petitioner at i, Skilling v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 2896 (2010) (No. 08-1394). 
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All of this action at the certiorari and argument stages produced 
only a single opinion. In Skilling, a six-justice majority—eschewing all 
of the potential limitations to the statute on which review had been 
granted in the three cases—held that the honest services portion of 
the mail fraud statute is limited to cases involving “bribes and 
kickbacks.”24 The Court styled this decision as statutory interpretation 
with a heavy dose of constitutional avoidance. Indeed, the majority 
went so far as taking the extraordinary step of warning Congress in a 
footnote that any effort to expand the mail fraud statute further 
would have to navigate through perilous constitutional shoals.25 The 
rationale in Skilling was simply that early honest services cases, 
predating Congress’s statutory fix after McNally, tended to involve 
bribes or kickbacks, and that limiting the statute to that “core” of 
coverage would avoid vagueness difficulties by cutting out all forms of 
fraud prosecution that did not involve such clear-cut venality. The 
Congress that enacted the statute, the Court said, would have 
preferred inclusion of bribery and kickback cases to nothing, so this 
was the most deferential available ruling.26 
Justice Scalia, not surprisingly, leapt to point out the result-
oriented weaknesses of the majority’s argument. He denied that there 
had ever been any such thing as an identifiable “core” of honest 
services cases involving bribes and kickbacks.27 He exclaimed that 
neither the statute nor the lower courts prior to the statute’s 
enactment had ever said anything about such a category. And he 
asserted that even such a “core” theory was likely to produce many 
cases of intolerably vague application. Scalia went on to chastise the 
majority at some length for legislating a new federal crime. He would 
have declared the statute unconstitutionally vague as applied to 
Skilling’s case and left it at that.28 
 
 24. Skilling v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 2896, 2931 (2010). 
 25. Id. at 2933 n.45. This was, after all, a third volley in an inter-branch engagement, albeit 
one that had seen twenty-five years of quiet. 
 26. Id. at 2931 n.43. 
 27. Id. at 2936–37 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). 
 28. Id. at 2940 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). In Black, the 
Court, while writing briefly on a procedural issue involving preservation of an objection, said 
reversal was required because of Skilling and remanded for harmless error analysis. Black v. 
United States, 130 S. Ct. 2963, 2970 (2010). In Weyhrauch, the Court merely vacated and 
remanded for analysis in light of Skilling. Weyhrauch v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 2971, 2971 
(2010). The lack of any opinion in Weyhrauch is especially disappointing given that questions 
about the duties that public officials do or do not owe to their constituents, for purposes of the 
law of fraud, have been legion and controversial, raising important issues about regulation of 
politics, especially federal regulation of state politics. 
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II. THE PROBLEM OF “FIDUCIARY” DUTY 
Fraud is no simple concept, and I cannot get it fully in view in this 
brief essay. The essential points for discussing the Court’s mail fraud 
cases perhaps can be developed with a few stylized examples. 
Suppose A deals antiques and B, a fifty-five-year-old Wall Street 
lawyer, is clearing out the family place in Vermont after her parents 
have passed away. B puts an old chest of drawers in the back of her 
SUV and drives it down to A’s shop in the village. B asks A, “I’d like 
to sell you this chest. How much is it worth and what can you give me 
for it?” A looks it over carefully and says, “It might fetch $1,000 at 
auction. I’ll give you $800.” B sells the chest to A. In fact, the chest is a 
rare example in mint condition. A’s assessment is that it is likely worth 
at least $10,000. 
Result? Clear fraud. Not only because this fits with common 
intuitions about fraud (which is, after all, a social construct before it is 
a legal concept): A has cheated B out of about $9,000 by using 
deception to get her to deliver her property to A. But also because the 
law of fraud has long been clear that a misrepresentation of opinion, 
especially from a speaker with specialized knowledge on whom the 
listener is likely to rely with justification, can be just as actionable a 
deception as a bald lie about a fact.29 
Now suppose that A is the same antique dealer and C is the 
lawyer’s mother, still alive and well at the age of eighty-eight. C 
invites A over for tea after church. A says how much he admires the 
same chest of drawers as he sees it sitting in C’s living room. C says it 
is taking up space and she would like to get it out of the house. A 
offers to pay her $500 to take it away, saying that he “might use it or 
see what I can get for it.”  C says that would be wonderful. Again, A’s 
eyeball assessment is that the chest is likely to fetch $10,000 or more. 
Result? Probably not fraud, but the matter is a bit more 
complicated. Intuitions could cut both ways here. We might think A 
did not misrepresent anything and so did not really deceive C, and 
caveat emptor should apply (caveat venditor, actually). Or we might 
think that C, knowing A’s expertise and having invited A over for tea 
after church, expected A to tell her if he knew the chest was very 
valuable and not to take advantage of her in this way. Poor C. She has 
no means to protect herself in this kind of encounter other than to 
 
 29. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 539 (1977). 
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rely on A to make any affirmative disclosure that ought to be made in 
the circumstances. C was deceived by A’s silence into delivering the 
chest into A’s hands. That’s fraud. 
The law has to take a normative stance here. It has to decide 
whether this form of conduct coupled with silence should be treated 
the same as affirmative misrepresentation for purposes of the law of 
fraud. Plainly there can be no general answer. Whether silence and 
behavior wrongfully deceive another is dependent on context. The 
best the law can do is to sort kinds of relationships into one category 
or another—this one does carry a duty of disclosure, this one does not, 
and so on. 
What criteria can the law use for that sorting? The question in 
fraud is whether wrongful deception is present. Deception is a tango. 
It takes two. A speaker (or, better, a deceiver, since speech is not 
always required) initiates some form of social intercourse that 
produces a result in a listener (or, perhaps better, a recipient). That 
result is the state of being deceived: believing x-prime is true when in 
fact x is true, and having that incorrect belief as a result of something 
the deceiver did or said. Whether a recipient arrives at this state of 
mind at the hands of the deceiver is heavily dependent on the 
recipient’s ex ante state of mind, in particular the relevant set of 
expectations she held before her interaction with the deceiver. 
The law therefore can (and does) generalize about relationships 
for purposes of fraud by considering the kinds of expectations that 
inhere in each context. People expect lots of disclosure in the lawyer’s 
or doctor’s office, for example, and so are much more likely to be 
deceived by nondisclosure in those places than on the used car lot 
where shoppers arrive with low expectations about candor. 
“Fiduciary duty,” at least for purposes of the present discussion, is 
simply a label used to designate relationships in which one party’s 
expectations about disclosure make nondisclosure more likely to 
produce a deception that the law of fraud might want to sanction as 
wrongful. As Justice Scalia pointed out in his concurrence in Skilling, 
it is not a particularly helpful label because it only begins the inquiry.30 
What kinds of relationships count as “fiduciary”? The law has to 
decide this as a normative matter. One method is circular: fiduciary 
 
 30. Skilling, 130 S. Ct. at 2936 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the 
judgment) (citing SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 85–86 (1943)). 
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relationships are those the law has traditionally called fiduciary, like a 
trustee or the director of a public company. This method is not 
satisfying because it freezes the law, lacks conceptual strength, and 
does not relate sufficiently to the underlying problem of determining 
the kinds of relationships in which greater disclosure is expected. 
Another method is to think about the concept of a fiduciary and its 
fundamental element of a relationship in which one party, for one or 
more beneficial purposes, reposes more than the ordinary degree of 
trust in another. This points back to the need to articulate fraud law 
contextually. 
Let me suggest a rough framework. In nondisclosure cases, courts 
might ask whether the particular kind of relationship is one in which 
nondisclosure constitutes wrongful deception because: (1) the 
deceived party had an expectation of receiving the relevant 
information; and (2) the law should deem that expectation (a) 
reasonable, because most of us would have had the same expectation, 
and (b) worthy of remedy, because it will be useful to encourage 
disclosure in this setting or the failure to have provided it is 
blameworthy for imposing or risking undue harm.31 
Thus, we might more fruitfully think of the problem of fiduciary 
duty in fraud as the problem of “relationship and context,” leaving 
aside the potentially misleading legal term “fiduciary,” the familiarity 
of which might tend to cause us to miss the essential conceptual 
problem in a particular case. Fiduciary duty, after all, is not a one-size-
fits-all concept. The duties of a fiduciary depend almost entirely on 
the kind of fiduciary she is. To say that someone has a “fiduciary duty” 
is simply to say that the law has decided she has more duties than the 
man on the street. 
The relationship and context problem in fraud can be seen at 
work in the honest services cases as easily as in the antique examples. 
To borrow from one aspect of the manifold accounting manipulations 
at Enron,32 suppose that A is the chief executive of a Fortune 500 
company that has two very large business units, one of which is in the 
 
 31. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 551(2)(e) (1977) (providing that for 
purposes of tort liability for misrepresentation, a party is under a duty to disclose facts basic to 
the transaction to the other party “if he knows that the other is about to enter into [the 
transaction] under a mistake as to [the facts], and that the other, because of the relationship 
between them, the customs of the trade or other objective circumstances, would reasonably 
expect a disclosure of those facts.”). 
 32. United States v. Skilling, 554 F.3d 529, 534–38 (5th Cir. 2009), cert. granted, 130 S. Ct. 
393 (2009), aff’d in part, vacated in part, remanded, 130 S. Ct. 2896 (2010). 
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retail energy delivery business and the other of which is in the 
wholesale energy trading business. The retail business is doing badly. 
It has failed to deliver on early predictions of great profitability that 
had driven up the parent company’s stock price, and faces the 
necessity of disclosing $100 million in losses that will publicly signal 
its failure for the first time. The wholesale business, meanwhile, has 
made much more money than expected by buying and selling energy 
contracts, much of it by placing speculative bets that have been highly 
profitable due to energy shortages. Reporting all of this income would 
alarm investors by signaling that the parent company’s earnings are 
those of a volatile trading company, rather than the steady “market 
maker” it has portrayed itself to be. Indeed, the company has been 
holding back a large amount of those trading earnings for several 
quarters in a reserve account designated for funding of “litigation 
risks.” 
After consulting with his chief accounting officer, CEO A 
authorizes the following measures: The retail and energy businesses 
will be combined into a single business unit and the parent company 
will no longer break out separately the financial results of the two 
businesses. The company will draw down the reserve account in the 
wholesale business by $100 million, deeming the litigation risk to have 
declined. No loss associated with the retail business will have to be 
reported. When the reorganization is announced to investors at the 
end of the quarter, the CEO tells the market it was done “to enhance 
efficiency” and says, in vague terms, that both businesses had a good 
quarter. 
Fraud? There has been a deception: the company’s shareholders 
are led to believe that all is well and steady when in fact the retail 
business is struggling and the wholesale business is dependent on 
volatile earnings produced by energy shortages. The deception was 
brought about by a series of actions and nondisclosures, rather than 
(or at least more than) outright lies. The deceiver (the CEO) is clearly 
a fiduciary in the eyes of the law, owing more than the ordinary 
person’s duties of disclosure. Do his duties include disclosure of the 
material facts here? I think most people would say yes, at least 
applying the analysis I have recommended for this kind of problem. 
Shareholders of a large public company would expect a CEO to tell 
them if two of the company’s largest businesses were in 
fundamentally different financial health than public information 
would lead one to believe. And they would certainly expect a CEO to 
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refrain from taking affirmative actions designed to conceal that truth. 
Those expectations are both reasonable and ones that the law would 
want to recognize in order to incentivize the kind of behavior by 
corporate managers that is likely to make markets attractive to 
investors. 
Notice something else about this fact pattern, something that 
distinguishes it from the antique case. The deceiver (the CEO) does 
not obtain property from the deceived party (the shareholders), 
though the deceived party may lose a great deal of money as a result 
of his conduct (by buying or holding an inflated stock that plummets 
in value when the truth outs). The CEO is not directly selling the 
shareholders anything. He is attempting to boost the price by making 
buyers in a secondary market for the company’s stock more eager to 
acquire the stock from other investors who are not affiliated with the 
company. A higher price in the secondary market makes the CEO 
more valuable in the market for CEOs, enhances his prestige, and 
makes his own stock option compensation more valuable when he 
exercises and sells it later (which may or may not be the very different 
fraud of insider trading). 
This is what the majority was talking about in its Skilling opinion 
when it explained how honest services prosecutions often involve 
what we might call a triangular fraud rather than a linear one.33 In a 
simple linear fraud, A cheats B to get B to give B’s property to A. In a 
triangular fraud, C gets A to do something that benefits C, as a result 
of which B is deceived and suffers a loss that does not go to either C 
or A. 
For example, suppose that C is a chemical company and A is a 
partner at a big law firm. For a year, A’s firm has been representing B, 
who is suing C on a very large personal injury claim that could involve 
punitive damages. C convinces A to drop the representation of B by 
implying that A’s firm might win a large and reliable book of business 
from C in the future. A tells B that she can no longer represent B 
because she does not have time and A obtains court permission to 
withdraw. A has harmed B through deceit. As B’s lawyer, A certainly 
has a greater than ordinary duty of candor toward both B and the 
court. 
 
 33. Skilling, 130 S. Ct. at 2926. 
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This type of triangular pattern is only part of what the honest 
services theory of fraud has been after. What makes the lawyer case 
special and difficult is not just the appearance of C in the scenario—
and the movement of a benefit from C to A rather than from B to 
A—but also that B has suffered a less tangible or quantifiable form of 
harm than the typical fraud victim. What B lost was not money 
directly (although that might ultimately result from A’s withdrawal) 
but her right to have her lawyer deal with her and the court honestly. 
That is a right in the eyes of the law, without doubt. And it is a 
valuable right, the deprivation of which is harmful to B—or at the 
very least places B at a risk of harm from which B arguably has a right 
to be free. 
The problem of relationship and context in fraud (or “the duty 
problem”) therefore has two dimensions. One is the dimension of 
expectation: How do we determine whether expectations regarding 
disclosure render a relationship one in which conduct and 
nondisclosure, not just misrepresentation, can work a fraud? The 
other is the dimension of harm: How do we determine when 
relationships are such that persons have rights less concrete than 
money or tangible property, but nonetheless substantial enough for 
deprivation of them to amount to the wrong of fraud? The honest 
services cases usually have raised at least one of these questions and 
sometimes, but not always, both of them. 
The controversy over honest services fraud prosecutions, of 
course, has the major added element of being a controversy over 
whether the deceptive party ought to go to prison rather than simply 
pay damages. From this perspective, many people would see a major 
distinction between the sly antique dealer who makes away with the 
chest and the corporate executive whose accounting fraud brings 
down a Fortune 500 company. More on the criminal dimension 
shortly. For now, the important point is that the duty problem in fraud 
is general to both civil and criminal sanctioning. 
A deception is not necessarily less serious simply because it is 
accomplished subtly through nondisclosure rather than overtly 
through a bald-faced lie. Indeed, one might say that the craftier a 
deception, the more likely it is to succeed—and therefore the more 
severely it ought to be sanctioned. The same goes for the matter of 
harm. A harmful deception is also not necessarily less serious because 
it deprives the victim of, for example, a legal right rather than a liquid 
asset. And cases involving nondisclosure and less tangible harm are 
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especially likely to be serious when they involve abuse of 
relationships of trust. 
III. THE PERSISTENCE OF THE PROBLEM 
In its opinion in Skilling, the Court seemed to recognize the two 
dimensions of the duty problem in fraud. But it failed to engage with 
them conceptually. The majority noted that some frauds are 
triangular, with the benefit (and inducement) to the deceiver flowing 
not from the victim who is deceived, but from a third party.34 The 
deceived party in such a scenario may thereby suffer a loss that is not 
the loss of a conventional property interest. The majority also 
referenced an early district court opinion on the subject of honest 
services fraud, stating, “[t]he actual deception that is practiced is in 
the continued representation by the employee to the employer that 
he is honest and loyal to the employer’s interests.”35 In other words, 
the nature of a particular relationship between A and B may render 
A’s nondisclosure to B deceptive and harmful because B is led to 
continue unwittingly in a course of reliance on A from which B 
otherwise would have exited. This may be fraud. It depends also, as we 
have said, on whether B rightfully would have expected such 
disclosure from A and therefore rightfully would have assumed the 
nonexistence of the factual matter in the absence of its disclosure. 
The Court supplied nothing of further assistance to these 
conceptual challenges facing fraud law. Instead of exploring the 
question of how the law might determine the kinds of relationships in 
which this theory of fraud ought to be viable, the Court drew a mostly 
arbitrary line around a set of cases that include a payment to the 
defendant that would be called a “bribe” or a “kickback.” Reasonable 
consensus for some time has been that the idea of a single duty of 
honest services (“the” duty of honest services, in the wording of the 
statute) sweeps far too broadly. It leaves the statute open to the kind 
of easy ridiculing it received at oral argument in the Court, with 
Justice Breyer, for example, asserting that an employee could be 
prosecuted in federal court for secretly reading the racing form when 
he knew he was supposed to be busily at work.36 
 
 34. Id. at 2926–27. 
 35. Id. at (quoting United States v. Procter & Gamble Co., 47 F. Supp. 676, 678 (D. Mass. 
1942)). 
 36. Transcript of Oral Argument at 30–31, Black v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 2963 (2010) 
(No. 08-876). 
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The Court’s effort to limit the statute, however, lacked principle. It 
made no distinctions on the dimension of relationship. In the eyes of 
the Court, Skilling, reporting a billion dollars in financial results as the 
CEO of Enron, seems no different as to his shareholders than the 
janitor reading the paper with his feet up on the desk as to the boss 
who pays him minimum wage. The Court simply said that there must 
be a bribe or a kickback of some sort flowing to the defendant in 
order for a theory of honest services deprivation to lie. This saves the 
statute from any vagueness difficulty, the Court said, because people 
who receive these kinds of secret and illicit payments are up to no 
good and cannot be heard to complain of surprise at being treated as 
fraudsters. 
One can defend the Court’s action on the ground that it 
successfully and clearly limited a statute that had been plagued with 
problems of vagueness and overbreadth. That was what everyone 
really wanted out of these certiorari grants and the Court gave it to 
them. 
The problem is that the Court’s ruling on the honest services 
statute will not in fact reduce uncertainty about the law of fraud, and 
the Court’s opinion provided no intellectual grist for a discussion that 
might have improved matters. The limitation to bribes and kickbacks 
has its own difficulties. Justice Scalia is probably right that the 
majority oversold the extent to which the old pre-McNally honest 
services cases were clear about what a bribe or a kickback really is in 
this context.37 Does the new rule require proof of a quid pro quo 
arrangement of the sort required under federal bribery statutes? Or 
would it be enough for a prosecutor to argue, for example, that a 
corporate executive committing accounting fraud expected a 
“kickback” in the form of illicit profits he would take from the sale of 
inflated stock options (or even in the form of additional options his 
employer might lavish on him for his success in running up the 
company’s stock price)? And, as Justice Scalia pointed out, won’t we 
still need some law on what kinds of employment, political, and other 
relationships give rise to this duty not to take bribes or kickbacks in 
the first place?38 
 
 37. Skilling, 160 S. Ct. at 2936–38 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the 
judgment). 
 38. Id. 
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Supreme Court opinions, of course, almost always open up new 
issues and fail to resolve old ones. The more serious deficit in the 
Skilling opinion is the missed opportunity to grapple seriously with 
the relationship and context problem in the law of fraud. The Court 
might have tried to develop some tools for determining what kinds of 
contexts give rise to fraud in this special form: A and B have a 
preexisting relationship of some legal significance; A gets some 
indirect benefit, not from B, as a result of deceiving B; A’s deceit takes 
the form of a nondisclosure or course of conduct rather than an 
affirmative misrepresentation; A’s nondisclosure or course of conduct 
causes B to continue to trust A and not to exercise B’s right or ability 
to exit the relationship with A; B is thereby wrongfully harmed or 
placed at risk of harm. 
This is not a problem that arose accidentally just because some 
federal courts, and a later Congress, chose to use the verbal 
formulation “honest services” with the mail and wire fraud statutes. It 
is a general problem for the law of fraud. Arguably it is the concept of 
fraud itself, not the modern formulation of “honest services,” that 
presents the vagueness difficulty.39 Yet no one has suggested that it is 
unconstitutional to criminalize fraud. Given the long and settled 
Anglo-American history of doing so, any such claim likely would not 
be taken seriously. 
Consider securities fraud, for example. The applicable statute and 
rule, somewhat like the mail and wire fraud statutes but with a 
different jurisdictional hook, proscribe all fraud.40 Courts have been 
left to do almost all of the work in determining what counts as fraud. 
There is not space here to cover the law of securities fraud, but take 
just three illustrations. First, the Supreme Court has held that a 
market-maker with control over the market for a particular security—
because of the particular relationship that exists between him and 
holders of the security—may commit fraud by failing to disclose to a 
seller of the security that the market-maker was obtaining a 
substantially higher price for those securities from a particular kind of 
buyer.41 Second, the courts have famously based the law of insider 
trading on the theory that certain kinds of sellers of securities, in 
possession of certain kinds of information, can defraud buyers by not 
 
 39. Prosser called fraud “a term so vague that it requires definition in nearly every case.”  
KEATON ET AL., supra note 6, § 105, at 727. 
 40. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78j (West 2010); 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5. 
 41. Affiliated Ute v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 152 (1972). 
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disclosing to the buyers that they have such information.42 Third, the 
very same accounting manipulations charged as honest services fraud 
in Skilling were charged as securities fraud and no one, including 
Skilling himself, suggested to the Supreme Court that there was any 
constitutional deficiency in that legal theory. 
These are theories of fraud based upon nondisclosure and duties 
arising from relationships in which victims are deemed to have certain 
rightful expectations of disclosure. After Skilling, we may see these 
kinds of theories still pressed even in mail fraud prosecutions, as 
prosecutors explore whether courts will recognize “property” 
interests of victims that are less tangible, like the right to accurate 
information about what a fiduciary to whom one has entrusted funds 
is doing with one’s money or that of others.43 In addition, Congress 
might respond to the Skilling decision by launching another volley in 
the back-and-forth over the mail and wire fraud statutes, perhaps 
broadening the definition of “property” for purposes of the statutes or 
attempting to define something about fiduciary duties with a different 
verbal formulation than “honest services.” 
If the Court had really wanted to grapple with these conceptual 
problems in the law of fraud, what might it have done with the mail 
fraud cases? First, the Court could have said that not everyone owes a 
duty of “honest services” and at least begun to specify the types of 
relationships in which such a duty exists. Second, the Court could 
have said that, even among those who owe such a duty, the content of 
that duty is not uniform—it may demand a little extra or a lot of the 
actor bearing it. Third, the Court could have said that no actionable 
fraud exists unless the person to whom that duty is owed is not only 
deceived but suffers some harm. The Court might have described 
actionable harm as taking the form of direct loss, being placed at a 
risk of loss that a person has a right to be free of, or being deprived of 
the ability to exit a relationship in circumstances in which exit likely 
would have been chosen. 
 
 42. See United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642 (1997) (holding that a person who trades 
securities using information misappropriated from another in violation of a fiduciary duty can 
be liable for insider trading). 
 43. Cf. Carpenter v. United States, 484 U.S. 19, 20–21 (1987), superseded by statute, 18 
U.S.C.A. § 1346 (West 2010), as recognized in United States v. Brumley, 116 F.3d 728, 730 (5th 
Cir. 1997) (holding, in prosecution for stock trades based on inside information, that advance 
knowledge about content of influential Wall Street Journal column constituted “property” for 
purposes of mail fraud statute). 
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These three moves would not have been enough. A fluid, 
contextual analysis about duty would have perpetuated concerns 
about notice and vagueness. The Court needed, perhaps above all, to 
draw some lines around criminal fraud in the mail fraud trilogy. The 
Court’s holding about “bribes and kickbacks,” at least as a formal 
matter, seems to do that. But it is an arbitrary line that is not 
grounded in any account of what makes some frauds involving abuse 
of trust relationships particularly condemnable such that they merit 
criminal punishment. And knowing what fraud is is a precondition for 
successfully sorting criminal cases from civil ones. 
I have written at length about how mental state inquiry in fraud 
law can be used both to draw the line between civil and criminal 
sanctions and to lessen concerns about fair notice that inevitably arise 
in the application of as broad a legal concept as fraud.44 The notice 
problem in fraud is not only about limitations on vagueness in 
criminal prohibitions—it is also about blameworthiness. A fraud tends 
to merit criminal punishment if the actor proceeds with fulsome 
awareness of the wrongfulness of her endeavor. Such actors also tend 
to be poor candidates for advancing sympathetic claims about lack of 
notice. The Justices, however, were nearly silent about mens rea in 
their Skilling opinions—a genuine oddity given that analysis in 
substantive criminal law nearly always begins, and often ends, with the 
question of the culpable actor’s mental state. 
CONCLUSION 
My present intervention is to say only that the problem of 
nondisclosure as fraud in particular kinds of relationships is an 
enduring one. The Justices missed a golden opportunity in the 2009 
October Term to develop a conceptual framework for confronting 
that problem. I say this fully aware, of course, that the Court is a 
voting body with nine members. What one jurist could have done with 
the mail fraud problem might be a far different thing than the 
outcome that could win five or more votes. Perhaps the Court’s 
“bribes and kickbacks” holding is simply the artifact of a compromise 
among the Justices to avoid striking down the statute entirely. But for 
now, the problem of nondisclosure as fraud will endure. These cases 
presented the Justices with a golden opportunity to develop a 
conceptual framework for confronting the relationship and context 
 
 44. See Samuel W. Buell, Novel Criminal Fraud, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1971, 1976–77 (2006). 
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problem in the law of fraud, but—as is often the case when we look to 
the Court to tackle big, conceptual problems—the result was 
disappointing. 
 
